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Abstract 
I summarise certain aspects of Paul Feyerabend’s account of the development 
of Western rationalism, show the ways in which that account is supposed to run 
up against an alternative, that of Karl Popper, and then try to give a preliminary 
comparison of the two. My interest is primarily in whether what Feyerabend 
called his ‘story’ constitutes a possible history of our epistemic concepts and 
their trajectory. I express some grave reservations about that story, and about 
Feyerabend’s framework, finding Popper’s views less problematic here. 
However, I also suggest that one important aspect of Feyerabend’s material, his 
treatment of religious belief, can be given an interpretation which makes it 
tenable, and perhaps preferable to a Popperian approach.  
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Introduction  
While working on Against Method, Paul Feyerabend conceived a project 
he called ‘The Rise of Western Rationalism’.1 At one point he seems to have 
intended this for publication in a single book, although it never came to fruition 
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as such. Instead, parts of the material survive in his published articles, many of 
which have been brought together in the volumes Farewell to Reason 
(Feyerabend (1987)), and Conquest of Abundance (Feyerabend (1999)). The 
same themes are also touched upon in the lectures (from 1992) recently 
published under the title The Tyranny of Science (Feyerabend (2011)). But the 
seeds of some of the ideas I have in mind are already clearly present in Science 
in a Free Society, where we find this:  
 
[S]cience is not sacrosanct. The mere fact that it exists, is admired, has 
results is not sufficient for making it a measure of excellence. Modern 
science arose from global objections against what went on before and 
rationalism itself, the idea that there are general rules and standards for 
conducting our affairs, affairs of knowledge included, arose from global 
objections to commonsense (example: Xenophanes against Homer) 
(Feyerabend (1978), p.16).  
 
This link between science and rationalism comes to assume great 
importance in Feyerabend’s later work. Having already suggested that science 
gained the upper hand in history by force and trickery, rather than by virtue of 
any intrinsic superiority, the aim of this project, I think it can safely be said, 
would have been to show that ‘rationalism’ came to supersede previous ways of 
thinking in much the same way. ‘[T]he “Rise of Rationalism in the West”’, he 
put it in one of his last papers, ‘shows the same kind of contempt towards non-
believers that accompanied the rise of modern science’ (Feyerabend (1995a) 
p.10, Feyerabend (1999), p.261)). (For more information on Feyerabend’s 
motivations for engaging in such debates, see Helmut Heit’s paper in this 
volume).  
In this paper, I summarise some aspects of Feyerabend’s account of the 
3 
 
development of Western rationalism, show the ways in which that account is 
supposed to run up against an alternative, that of Karl Popper, and then try to 
give a preliminary comparison of the two, a comparison not of their fidelity to 
the ancient sources, but based on the conceptual tenability of their rival 
pictures. My interest is primarily in whether Feyerabend’s story constitutes a 
possible history of our epistemic concepts and trajectory. I express some grave 
reservations about that story, and about Feyerabend’s framework, but I also 
suggest that one important aspect of his material can be given an interpretation 
which may make it tenable.  
 
Knowledge in the Ancient World  
 According to Feyerabend’s potted history, life before the agrarian 
revolution (in the Neolithic era, circa 10,000 years ago) was really rather 
idyllic:  
 
[E]very individual possessed all the knowledge and all the skills that 
were necessary for survival. Moreover, it took them only about two to 
four hours per week to take care of their necessities. Thus they could sit 
around, sing songs, philosophize or do whatever else seemed interesting 
and rewarding to them.  . . .  The small groups of hunters and gatherers 
that roamed the countryside . . . collaborated in a fairly democratic 
manner (Feyerabend (1985), pp.155-6).  
 
Even after the agrarian revolution, when skills became specialised, the 
epistemic situation didn’t change much. Ancient navigators, craftsmen, farmers, 
etc., were familiar with a great variety of materials, plants, animals; they could 
identify and alleviate bodily and mental afflictions; they travelled across 
national boundaries and assimilated foreign ideas and techniques (Feyerabend 
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(1993b), p.6 (Feyerabend (1999), p.265)). An enormous amount of information 
resided in their customs, industries, and in the common sense of the time. 
Acquiring knowledge was part of living. The knowledge acquired was 
‘relevant’, and reflected personal and group concerns (Feyerabend (1987), p.4). 
It was not yet a commodity.  
 This somewhat romantic view of prehistory has not gone unchallenged 
by archaeologists.
2
 However, other archaeologists are still willing to defend 
something like this view.
3
  
 A clearer picture of the situation emerges when literature comes on the 
scene.  
 
The Homeric Period  
 In Hesiod’s cosmology, the universe was originally formless (‘Chaos’), 
and different powers battled to impose their own metaphysical-cum-social 
order onto things (as described in Theogony, and Works and Days). So there 
was no ‘way the world is’, but only different ways the world had been forced to 
be by divine and human agencies.
4
  
 Feyerabend presents the Homeric period as involving a related world-
view, characterised by an aggregative metaphysic, part of which is already 
familiar to readers of the first edition of Against Method.
5
 According to this 
conception, the natural world, like the political world, is subdivided into 
regions which are subject to different (natural) laws (Feyerabend (1987), p.96). 
Gods, like humans, have their moirai, their allotted shares of the world. These 
are separated from each other, and qualitatively different. Thus the world at 
large comprises an aggregate with different divinities ruling over its different 
parts. But the aggregate character of the Homeric world was not restricted to 
the very large — it is found also in the smallest constituents. In this world,  
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[t]here are no concepts that forge the human body and the human soul 
into a unit. There are no means of representation that would enable 
artists to give optical expression to such a unity. Both conceptually and 
optically, human beings are like rag dolls, sewed together from relatively 
isolated elements . . . and functioning as transit stations for events (ideas, 
dreams, feelings) that may arise elsewhere and only briefly merge with a 
particular human being. Action in our sense does not exist in this world; 
a hero does not decide to bring about a certain event and then cause it, he 
finds himself involved in one series of events rather than in another and 
his life develops accordingly. All things, animals, carriages, cities, 
geographical regions, historical sequences, entire tribes are presented in 
this ‘additive’ manner — they are aggregates without ‘essence’ or 
‘substance’ (Feyerabend (1987), p.97).  
 
 In his last works, Feyerabend extended his claims about the scope of this 
metaphysic even further. It applied, he suggested, not just to objects in the 
Homeric world, but also to the world-views of the Homeric Greeks and to the 
concepts which they used to evaluate their dealings with objects. The world-
views in question were eclectic and opportunistic. They exhibit no coherent 
knowledge, i.e., no comprehensive truth that goes beyond an enumeration of 
details, but there are many pieces of information, obtained in different ways 
from different sources, and collected for the benefit of the curious. The best 
way of presenting such knowledge is the list — and the oldest scientific works 
(the Babylonian-Assyrian word lists (Feyerabend (1995a), p.5)) were indeed 
collections of facts, parts, coincidences, and problems in several specialised 
domains. In the time of Hesiod, for example, truth consisted in ‘a summation of 
individual reports’ (Feyerabend (1984), p.97).6 (This, of course, is why 
Socrates continually runs into people who answer his ‘What is . . . ?’ questions 
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by presenting lists). Although these lists contained an inner structure, their 
connecting principles were not explicitly formulated. That the gods themselves 
have complete knowledge does not mean that their gaze penetrates the surface 
to perceive a hidden unity beneath events, but only that they have the most 
complete lists at their disposal. The idea of a deeper unity lying behind 
phenomena is no part of this world view, according to Feyerabend.
7
  
 
The Demise of the Homeric World-View  
 How does Feyerabend think this Homeric world-view was deposed? 
Most Greeks took the information contained in their trades and crafts for 
granted (Feyerabend (1993b), p.6 (Feyerabend (1999), p.265)). However, the 
social groups which prepared what is now known as Western rationalism and 
laid the intellectual foundations for Western science refused to take this 
abundance at face value (Feyerabend (1988b), pp.166-7). Aiming at something 
more profound, some of their early social critics, ‘philosophers’ (as they came 
to be called), started the work of knowledge all over again, this time without 
the details but with a maximum of generality. They denied that the world was 
as rich and knowledge as complex as the crafts and the commonsense of their 
time seemed to imply. These early ‘rational’ critics of tradition, says 
Feyerabend,  
 
were religious reformers, for they heaped scorn on the traditional gods 
and replaced them with monsters. They were philosophers, for they 
preferred words to things, speculation to experience, principles to rules 
of thumb; and they did not mind when their ideas conflicted with 
tradition or with phenomena of the most obvious kind (Feyerabend 
(1993b), p.6, emphasis added (Feyerabend (1999), p.265)).  
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They were also scientists of sorts (Feyerabend (1995b), p.806). And they were 
rather conceited, and motivated by power, rather than by truth. Being 
convinced of the superiority of their efforts, these thinkers deemed the 
opposing phenomena spurious and tradition worthless (Feyerabend (1993b), 
p.6 (Feyerabend (1999), p.265)). Their main offender was Xenophanes.  
 
Xenophanes  
 Karl Popper’s account of the pre-Socratics, and especially of 
Xenophanes, is one of Feyerabend’s principal targets.8 Feyerabend agrees that 
Xenophanes counts as a forerunner of Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’; it’s just 
that he considers this an indictment, rather than a compliment.  
 Let’s remind ourselves of the important role that Xenophanes plays in 
Popper’s account of the rise of rational thought. In his 1958 paper ‘Back to the 
pre-Socratics’, Popper conjectured that it was Thales who founded the new 
tradition of tolerating and encouraging criticism. This is what he calls ‘the 
scientific or rational tradition’ (Popper (1945), pp.122, 125) something that is 
both local and hard to transplant. Two generations later, Xenophanes, who 
brought the Ionian tradition to Elea (in Southern Italy), was the first 
philosopher to be fully conscious of the fact that ‘all our knowledge was 
guesswork’, and yet that ‘we may nevertheless, by searching for that knowledge 
“which is the better”, find it in the course of time’ (Popper (1963), p. 152). 
Prefiguring Galileo and Einstein, Xenophanes not only understood this, ‘the 
true theory of knowledge’, but also realised that there is no such thing as 
induction (ibid.). He was the founder of the so-called ‘sceptical’ tradition 
whose later members include Socrates, Montaigne, and Hume (Popper (1992), 
p.192).  
 According to Feyerabend (who always used the classic Fragmente der 
Vorsokratiker (Diels & Krantz 1903) as his source-book for such texts), 
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Xenophanes not only opposed the cultural tendencies of his time, he is 
supposed to have revealed their foundations and criticised them (Feyerabend 
(1987), p.93). First, he criticised the idea that there are gods who resemble 
humans, who are cruel, angry and treacherous like epic heroes, and who 
influence history. The core of his negative theology, as we know it, his brief 
argument against polytheism, consists of the following fragments, quoted by 
both Feyerabend and Popper:  
 
Everything humans despise and condemn and try to avoid,  
theft, and adultery, and lying deception of others  
Homer and Hesiod respectfully brought to the gods. (Fragments 11 & 
12).  
 
The mortals consider that gods were created by birth 
that they wore clothes, had voices, and also a form. 
But if cattle, or lions, or horses had hands, just like humans;  
if they could paint with their hands, and draw and thus create pictures —  
then the horses in drawing their gods would draw horses; and cattle 
would give us pictures and statues of cattle; and therefore 
each would picture the gods to resemble their own constitution. 
(Fragment 15).  
 
Aethiopian gods — snubnosed and black  
Thracians — blue-eyed and blond . . . (Fragment 16).9  
 
In sum: the old gods are immoral, and not praiseworthy (Fragments 11 & 12), 
they are anthropomorphic (Fragment 15), and they are ethnomorphic (Fragment 
16). Maybe there is ridicule here, as Feyerabend contends, but it comes along 
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with a moral and conceptual criticism: Homer and Hesiod are wrong to portray 
beings superior to us as sharing many of our worst faults, as well as the 
limitations of our species and the constitution of only one of our various races, 
their race.  
 Notice that this is not the most familiar argument against polytheism, 
which tries to reduce to absurdity the idea of a plurality of beings with supreme 
or unlimited power. (The ‘absurdity’ in question is not yet a contradiction, 
though, so could still fairly easily be clung onto). Feyerabend does make an 
important objection to such an argument against polytheism, which is that it is 
unsound (Feyerabend 1987, pp.95-99).
10
 That is, no believer in the Homeric 
pantheon would accept that each of their gods is credited with supreme or 
unlimited power, or that if one god had more power than another, the latter 
would not really be a god. Xenophanes’ objection, though, is not fleshed out as 
this reductio, however much recent fans of his arguments would like it to have 
been.  
 Although Xenophanes is generally regarded as somewhat dilettantish 
(Feyerabend calls him ‘a conceited bigmouth’, albeit ‘one with considerable 
charm’ (Feyerabend (1987), p.91)), Feyerabend complains that this criticism of 
polytheism has been endorsed or favoured by many scholars who have little in 
common with each other. He notes that modern writers speak of Xenophanes’ 
‘destructive criticism’ (W. K. C. Guthrie), or ‘acute criticism’ (Mircea Eliade) 
of previous ideas. Xenophanes, says Hermann Fränkel (the German-American 
classical scholar), ‘dared to reject the traditional tales as old inventions’ 
(Fränkel (1960), p.341, translated as Fränkel (1974), p.121, and quoted in 
Feyerabend (1987), p.91). Finally, Popper reads the fragments as the ‘discovery 
that the Greek stories of the gods were not to be taken seriously, because they 
represented the gods as human beings’; and he, too, speaks of a ‘criticism’ of 
existing ideas (Popper (1992), p.192, quoted on pp.94 & 95 of Feyerabend 
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(1987)).  
 According to Feyerabend, such later admirers claim that Xenophanes’ 
critique led to the rise of rationalism. But if this is true, are Xenophanes’ 
objections to traditional forms of thought really as penetrating and fertile as 
many philosophers believe? Do they really compel people to abandon the old 
anthropomorphic, ethnomorphic idea of gods who have human features and act 
in the world? Feyerabend argues that they don’t. He set out to show what he 
called ‘the basic dishonesty of all Rational philosophies’, including Popper’s. 
Their dishonesty is supposed to consist in the fact that they ‘introduce strange 
assumptions which are neither plausible nor argued for, and then ridicule 
opponents for holding different views’ (Feyerabend (1987), p.13).  
 
Xenophanes’ Positive Theology  
 Before we tackle this issue, let’s recall that Xenophanes didn’t just 
criticise the existing polytheism: a second part of his work comprises a positive 
theology (usually interpreted as monotheistic). The fragments in question are as 
follows:  
 
One god alone is the greatest, the greatest of gods and of men 
not resembling the mortals, neither in shape nor in insight.  
 
Always without any movement he remains in a single location 
as it would be unseemly to walk now to this, now to that place.  
 
All of him sees, all of him knows, all of him hears.  
 
But without effort, by insight alone, he moves all that is. (Fragments 23-
6).  
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Part of the burden of Feyerabend’s case against modern ‘rationalist’ 
sympathisers is that this single god of Xenophanes’ positive theology is in no 
way a clear improvement on its forerunners. For one thing, what he offers in 
their place is a creature that is still anthropomorphic, but ‘far from human’ 
(Feyerabend (1987), p. 95), in fact inhuman, in the sense that some of his 
human properties are monstrously increased, while other, ‘balancing’ features 
have been removed:  
 
What we have is not a being that transcends humanity but a monster 
considerably more terrible than the slightly immoral Homeric gods could 
ever aspire to be. These one could still understand; one could speak to 
them, try to influence them, [etc]. There existed personal relations 
between the Homeric gods and the world they guided (and often 
disturbed). The God of Xenophanes, who still has human features, but 
enlarged in a grotesque manner, does not permit such relations. It is 
strange and . . . frightening to see with what enthusiasm many 
intellectuals embrace this monster, regarding it as a first step towards a 
‘more sublime’ interpretation of divinity (Feyerabend (1987), p.95).  
 
If this isn’t merely a personal preference, then it’s an ethical evaluation of the 
being that Xenophanes has in mind, rather than an epistemic evaluation of his 
reasons for postulating that being. Feyerabend didn’t really accept that 
distinction, since he had come to think that views (including scientific views) 
should be evaluated only by ethical (or eudaimonistic) criteria.
11
 His arguments 
for that supposition are beyond my remit here; all I can say is that I think they 
are flawed. (If they were correct, the only kind of beliefs it would ever be 
acceptable to have would be beliefs that are conducive to human happiness or 
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human flourishing).  
 Xenophanes’ way of introducing this new god also arouses Feyerabend’s 
anger. In introducing this strange creature, Xenophanes’ dishonesty, according 
to Feyerabend, consisted in his taking advantage of certain new intellectual 
rules:  
 
The God is introduced because Xenophanes can prove his most 
important properties. Not perception, not tradition, not the demands of 
piety determine these properties, but rather certain intellectual rules that 
were just discovered, and yet already act as judges over existence and 
nonexistence (Feyerabend (1984), p.104).  
 
Feyerabend speculates that Xenophanes chooses this particular concept of god 
because it lends itself to proofs by reductio ad absurdum. That is, Feyerabend 
takes it that Xenophanes thinks he can show that the suppositions that the god 
is many, or that he came to be, or that his power is limited, lead to absurdities. 
But this ‘because’ can only be a speculation about Xenophanes’ motives, since 
we have no evidence about those motives, and Xenophanes’ negative theology 
(as Feyerabend presents it, at least) doesn’t include such an argument. As an 
objection it would be merely ad hominem anyway, and would touch rationalism 
itself only if we think that acceptable views and procedures can only be 
introduced by people whose motives are pure.  
 
Feyerabend’s Metaphilosophy  
 Implicit in Feyerabend’s comments about truth, proof, argument, reason, 
and reasons is a metaphilosophy, one which is made more explicit elsewhere, 
especially in The Tyranny of Science. According to this, proofs and arguments 
were simply ‘new kinds of stories, whose truth “followed from” their inner 
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structure and needed no support from traditional authorities’ (Feyerabend 
(1987), p. 66). In one frame of mind, Feyerabend himself declined to give 
arguments in favour of presenting ‘stories’ (hence the title of my paper); in 
another, he construed arguments as stories. But this metaphilosophy is deeply 
problematic. We can of course imagine people who don’t do much by way of 
argument. But neither the rejection of all argument nor the construal of 
arguments as mere stories is even a possible human stance, for either of them 
would mean that one’s stories, and beliefs, and thoughts, and their components 
had no non-contingent connections with one another. That kind of mind would 
be fragmented in exactly the way that only the most naïve empiricists think 
minds are: mere aggregates of thought-atoms, any combinations of which could 
hold at any moment with no implications for any other moment. One doesn’t 
have to be a Kantian to want to avoid this view, to think that no human could 
really be entirely like that.  
 Nevertheless, even if we concede that Feyerabend is presenting a story 
rather than an argument, his story of the rise of rationalism can be addressed by 
critical arguments, and compared with other stories.  
 
Did Rationalism Triumph by Argument, or just by Rejection?  
 Feyerabend then asks: when it comes to Xenophanes’ negative theology, 
are we dealing with a criticism (which is what Popper calls it) or simply with a 
rejection of the idea of regional gods that share the properties of the region they 
dominate? And his answer is: the latter. The rejection becomes a criticism only 
if we can assume:  
 
(A) that the concept of a god (or, more generally, that of a Truth or of a 
Being) which changes from one culture to the next is not valid anywhere 
or, conversely, that a fitting concept of a deity (or a fitting concept of 
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truth or being) must be valid everywhere  
 
and  
 
(B) that the receiver of the criticism accepts (A), at least implicitly. Only 
then will the mockery hit its mark. Otherwise the opponent can say ‘you 
are not speaking of our gods, but of an intellectual monster of your own 
invention which you use as a measure for all other gods. This has nothing 
to do with us’. (Feyerabend (1987), p.96).  
 
 Many modern authors praise Xenophanes for making assumption (A). 
Feyerabend accuses them of being insincere, since not all of them believe that 
the world is ordered by divine powers (Feyerabend (1987), p.96). But this 
accusation is unfair, since one doesn’t have to believe that a single god exists in 
order to use Xenophanes’ reductio against the idea of a plurality of gods. That 
is, (B) is wrong: its challenge is to Xenophanes’ positive theology, not to his 
negative theology, against which it is ineffective. As a matter of fact ‘the 
Milesians were unanimous in recognising the divine nature of their primary 
substances’ (McKirahan (1994), p.60), but one could accept Xenophanes’ 
criticism of polytheism without accepting his proof of monotheism. One could 
use it as an argument for atheism, for instance. (This would undermine the 
parallel between religion and epistemology on which Feyerabend is trading).  
More importantly, though, Feyerabend insists that not everyone accepted 
proposition (A): there existed authors and entire cultures, both before and after 
Xenophanes, who explicitly denied it. Some of the most intelligent authors who 
wrote after him (Feyerabend cites Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Herodotus) 
‘either disregarded [Xenophanes] or went a different way’ (Feyerabend (1987), 
p.98). However, neither their disregarding Xenophanes nor even their pursuing 
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others sorts of enquiries yet means that these figures would, on reflection, have 
(‘explicitly’) denied (A), which is what Feyerabend needs here.  
The nearest he gets to an example of this is Protagoras, whose 
relativism, Feyerabend claims, denies both assumptions of Xenophanes’ 
‘argument’, and thus agrees with basic principles of the Homeric world-view. 
Protagoras’ doctrine, according to Feyerabend, ‘was an exact mirror-image’ of 
the world at that time (Feyerabend (1987), p.99). Now perhaps Protagoras is an 
example of someone who would have denied (A). Its typically relativist use of 
the term ‘valid’, makes that impossible to assess, though. This modern 
(specifically Californian?) concept of ‘validity’ is not one that Protagoras 
himself used.  
Even if we ignore this, and concentrate on what we do know of 
Protagoras, further problems arise. His famous gnomic utterance ‘Man is the 
measure of all things’, which Feyerabend relies on heavily, is capable of being 
construed in different ways, not all of which are versions of relativism. Even if 
it expresses a version of relativism, the relativity may not be to individuals or 
cultures, as Feyerabend imagines, but to humanity as a whole.
12
 This would not 
give Feyerabend the example he needs, of someone who explicitly denies (A). 
And finally, even if Protagoras was exactly the kind of relativist Feyerabend 
imagines, we could still question whether he really used (rather than merely 
professed, in his philosophical moments) a relativist concept of truth. The best 
that can be said for Feyerabend’s claim is that we cannot get close to knowing 
its truth: we cannot now say whether Protagoras would have regarded 
Xenophanes’ criticism as an objection to polytheism.  
 When Feyerabend insists that assumptions (A) and (B) were not 
applicable to the Homeric world I also think he misses the evidence on the 
other side. The fact that the Greeks continued to pray to their own gods (rather 
than any local gods) when they were trading or fighting abroad suggests that 
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they did accept (A). When travelling in Ethiopia, for example, there is no 
reason to think that Thracians would have there worshipped (only) snub-nosed 
black gods, and no red-haired blue-eyed ones. It is true that the Greek gods had 
their moirai, but these are of the other kind Feyerabend mentions, not of the 
kind he imagines here. That is, they are cosmological domains such as the sea, 
the underworld, Mount Olympus, etc., rather than human geographical 
domains. The issue that Feyerabend identifies doesn’t arise with the 
cosmological domains because the gods who are their denizens are members of 
a cohort of deities, not alternatives to one another.  
 
Feyerabend’s Initial ‘Relativistic’ Account of the how the Transition was 
Effected  
 As we saw, Feyerabend thought rationalism and science conquered their 
opponents either by force, or by fraud, and that they could only have triumphed 
in this way. At first, anyway, his own account involves what he identifies as 
‘the relativistic idea that the popularity of philosophical positions is a result of 
power (or deception), not of argument’ (Feyerabend (1987), p.99). The fact that 
by now many intellectuals regard theoretical, or ‘objective’ knowledge as the 
only knowledge worth considering is a conceit which would have substance, he 
supposes, only if scientists and philosophers looking for universal and 
objective knowledge and a universal and objective morality had succeeded in 
finding the former and convinced, rather than forced, dissenting cultures to 
adopt the latter. But according to Feyerabend this is not the case. ‘[T]he 
regionalism of phenomena was never overcome, neither by philosophers, nor 
by scientists, while the regionalism of social phenomena was repressed or 
destroyed by violence, not shown to be inadequate by ethical reasoning’ 
(Feyerabend (1987), p.100, emphasis in the original; see also ibid., p.168, and 
Feyerabend (1986), p.99).  
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 Feyerabend never made a convincing case for this idea that the social 
change in question was an exercise of force de majeure. He never presented 
any evidence that this was the case, as far as I can see. Even his more promising 
idea that it was a con-trick is problematic. Certainly he did nothing to show 
how defenders of the ancient pantheon of Gods might have rebutted (rather 
than merely ignored) Xenophanes’ objection. It’s quite true that theoretical 
knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge worthy of the name, and that 
some rationalists (including Popper, I think) are wrong to forget this. But 
overall, as I shall now argue, Popper’s account of the pre-Socratics and the 
transition to ‘rationalism’ is preferable to Feyerabend’s.  
 
Institutionalisation of the Critical Attitude  
For Popper, what the pre-Socratics did was to socially firm up and 
canonise or institutionalise an attitude that humans can always potentially take 
towards beliefs and their evaluation, the critical (or scientific, or for Popper the 
‘rational’) attitude. If Popper is right, this was the first time that such an attitude 
was institutionalised. (That seems plausible – we know of no previous 
sequence of ideas like the pre-Socratic sequence).  
 Feyerabend, though, contends that the rise of Western rationalism was 
the result of a discovery, the discovery of ‘certain intellectual rules’ 
(Feyerabend (1984), p.104), or the discovery that concepts can be connected in 
special ways, called ‘arguments’ (Feyerabend (1978), p.53).  
 This can’t be right. The attitude in question, the critical attitude, is one 
that humans could (at least in principle, if not in terms of social possibility) 
have taken prior to Thales, and which is humanly possible in any culture. For 
this attitude is routinely taken every day in evaluating the (non-theoretical, non-
cosmological, non-philosophical and non-religious) beliefs of one’s fellow 
human beings. Logic has a history, of course. But Xenophanes’ argument relies 
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on no more than reductio ad absurdum, and this mode of argument is implicit 
(even if not explicit) in any human way of life. That is, all socialised adult 
humans are capable of having thought-sequences of the form ‘What if X was 
the case? Well, that would mean that Y would also be the case. But Y isn’t the 
case, or is absurd, or otherwise untenable. So X can’t be the case’.  
Feyerabend is denying this (which I think is only one component in a 
Kantian conception of the unity of humanity), and I think we ought not to 
follow him. He argued that Xenophanes et al. introduced to humanity ‘rational’ 
methods of argument per se. On that supposition, he would certainly have had a 
point against Popper: that would have to have been a trick or an exercise of 
force. Here we run up against one of the limits of rationality, as it were: one 
can’t successfully argue someone into accepting or joining the rationalist 
tradition, since to do so would presuppose that they were already responsive to 
argument (and thus already part of that tradition).  
Feyerabend’s idea that the transition to rationalism was a con-trick also 
faces the problem that Xenophanes may have been pointing out to those 
already in the sequence (among others) that their beliefs about gods can be 
evaluated in the same way as they already evaluated their own and others’ 
beliefs about physical cosmology, and that when one does so, they are revealed 
as problematic. Feyerabend here follows the usual supposition that 
Xenophanes’ argument against the Homeric gods is the first example of 
reductio. But this need not be right. As Popper suggests (Popper (1963), p.139), 
Xenophanes’ predecessor Anaximander may well already have argued against 
the cosmology of his predecessor, Thales, in just this way. That is, to Thales’ 
claim that the earth is floating on water, Anaximander may have objected that 
this would involve an infinite regress, which is an absurdity. In this way he 
might have come up with his own cosmological idea, according to which the 
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earth remains where it is because it is equally distant from all other 
cosmological things.  
 
From Religion to Relativism?  
 Even if in his description of the ancients, Feyerabend can show that gods 
were regarded as having their allotted shares in the world of the geographical 
kind he imagines (which I have denied), he makes little attempt to show that the 
same thesis makes sense when transposed from the religious into the 
epistemological or metaphysical key. More generally and significantly, he 
relies on a dubious transition from the religious to the epistemological. There 
may be parallels between the concept of god and concepts which express 
epistemic ideals, but to note this is not to show that ancient people had a 
concept of truth or of reality according to which what is true or what is real can 
vary from one culture to the next. Epistemic concepts are not on a par with 
religious concepts in this respect: even if all parties to the debate did 
understand what it means to deny that there is a single god (the concept of a 
god at that time had this kind of flexibility built-in), it has not been shown that 
they understood what it would be for there to be a plurality of incompatible 
truths, that is, what it would have been for a relativist concept of truth to be 
operative. Feyerabend reads his own preferred perspective on epistemic 
concepts (the one he calls ‘the relativism of Protagoras’, or ‘Protagorean 
relativism’ (Feyerabend (1987), p.99, Feyerabend (1993a), pp.187-8)) back into 
the thoughts of these people too swiftly, and with insufficient justification. He 
doesn’t give any evidence that the ancients (not just Protagoras, but laypeople) 
would really have accepted statements of the form ‘While p is true for me, not-
p is true for you’.  
 
Feyerabend’s Incredible Homeric Greeks  
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It is true that the way in which Popper writes makes the pre-Socratic 
thinkers seem like the well-behaved participants in a mid-twentieth century 
logic class (Logic & Cosmology 101, perhaps). But although Popper’s pre-
Socratics aren’t quite weird enough, this cuts only shallowly against him, since 
he could easily concede that the pre-Socratics were stranger than he presented 
them as being. All he needs is that they had the sequence of thoughts in 
question, and somehow generated the social tradition he has in mind. 
Feyerabend’s Homeric Greeks, though, are too weird. As I shall now argue, this 
cuts deeply against Feyerabend, for his Greeks aren’t even possible people.  
The book Feyerabend mainly relied on in his account of the Homeric 
Greeks is The Discovery of the Mind (German original, 1948), in which 
German classical philologist Bruno Snell suggested that Homer’s characters are 
different kinds of people from us, with no sense of inner conflict in decision-
making, and thus no inner core of identity.  
As regards Homer’s epics these claims are now widely regarded as 
having been discredited, since various people, including Bernard Williams (in 
his Sather Lectures, delivered at the University of Berkeley in 1989 and 
subsequently published as Shame and Necessity (Williams (1993)), have been 
able to find passages in Homer that give very clear evidence of characters being 
in inner conflict when deliberating about decisions. Perhaps Feyerabend 
attended these lectures, for he referred to them in a footnote to Conquest of 
Abundance (Feyerabend (1999), p.25, note 12), and conceded the point. What 
remains is, as he puts it, ‘that “Homeric Man” has less coherence and is less 
separated from (or better integrated into) his surroundings than the 
“autonomous individual” of later times’. This may be true, but it isn’t enough to 
re-condition his argument.  
Feyerabend’s versions of Snell’s claims are also problematic when 
understood as claims not merely about Homeric characters, but about all Greeks 
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at that time. That the burden of proof here is on him, rather than his opponents, 
I think is clear. Modern philosophers like Kant, Strawson, Quine and Davidson 
supply us with a priori arguments for supposing that the Homeric world-view 
simply couldn’t have been as different from ours in these fundamental respects 
as Feyerabend supposes. Feyerabend’s Homeric Greeks are, after all, very 
strange indeed.  
For example, one ought to be very suspicious of his idea that action 
simply didn’t exist in the Homeric world. There are, it is true, people who think 
of themselves as instruments (of God’s will, for example). But it is impossible 
to imagine people who don’t conceive of themselves as agents at all. Thinking 
of a person as merely a ‘transit station’ (Feyerabend (1987), p. 97) for 
externally-induced phenomena would be to make nonsense of their assertions, 
including the assertion that they were not genuine agents or authors of their 
own actions. Attempting to think of oneself like that would prevent the 
application not just of the concept of action but also of the concept of thought 
(because thinking is itself an activity). There is a kind of (pragmatic?) self-
vitiation here, and that should be enough to force us to re-think this view, even 
if it seems to be suggested by the literature.  
 Another of Feyerabend’s suppositions clearly amounts to the contention 
that these people just didn’t have the concept of a person. This would have to 
be stacked up not only against Peter Strawson’s argument that this concept is 
primitive relative to the concepts of mind and body, but also to mountains of 
anthropological data. A further conflict with Strawson’s perspective emerges 
when we consider that Feyerabend presents these folk as having the concept of 
experiences (or even perhaps that of sense-data?) prior to that of material 
objects).  
 Finally, Feyerabend’s account of Xenophanes’ argument presupposes 
that the Greeks had the concept of belief (opinion) before they had the concept 
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of truth. But one doesn’t need Donald Davidson to see that, for creatures with a 
language, at least, having the concept of belief requires having the concept of 
(objective) truth. Why? Because believing that p is believing that p is the case. 
Assumptions (A) and (B) are therefore rehabilitated, at least insofar as they 
apply to the concept of truth. (Feyerabend would not, of course, have been 
impressed by such a priori philosophical considerations. But to take the 
anthropological accounts which violate them at face value would represent a 
hopelessly uncritical, indeed thoughtless, empiricism).  
 
The Origin of Philosophy  
By contrast with Feyerabend’s story, Popper’s idea that Thales initiated 
the new institution he had in mind, the tradition of critical discussion of one’s 
own theoretical views, as well as the theoretical views of others, is not only 
possible, but plausible. For Popper what is important is that science starts thus, 
with the pre-Socratics. Not being as persuaded that science really involves 
criticism to the extent that Popper would like, I would rather stress that it’s 
philosophy that starts thus. That is, what we (in the West) fully recognise as 
philosophy begins with the pre-Socratics (not startling news, I know). Prior to 
Thales there are, of course, first-order ideas, including cosmologies, but there is 
not (as far as we know) the second-order tradition that Popper had in mind, the 
tradition not merely of allowing but of encouraging the critical evaluation of 
first-order ideas (Popper (1963), p.127). (When the tradition of evaluating 
second-order ideas begins is another question, of course. That’s not necessarily 
with Thales). There can be no objection to calling this ‘rationalism’ if one 
wants to do so (as Popper does). I would not follow anyone who thought this 
was the beginning of rationality itself (as if we had to say that Thales was the 
first rational being!), but Popper doesn’t have to say that. What Thales founded 
was an institution that encapsulated and amplified something whose possibility 
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already characterised human lives, critical discussion. I personally wouldn’t 
call this the first rational institution, since I’m not wedded as exclusively to 
critical rationality as Popper was. But I agree with him that it’s the start of 
something important, and something that all human beings have the pre-
requisites for – the critical component of philosophizing and science.  
 
Feyerabend on Philosophy  
Perhaps this gives us a clue to why Feyerabend, in his later life, was 
deeply ambivalent about philosophy itself. More than once he explicitly denied 
that he was a philosopher (Feyerabend (1993)). In a way, he put himself and 
saw himself outside one very important component of the academic 
philosophical tradition, an overtly critical component, the component that 
insists that first-order ideas, wherever they come from and whatever their social 
backing, can and indeed should be evaluated, at least in part by considering 
what can be said against them. However, this doesn’t mean that he really 
escaped the philosophical tradition. For it’s also notable that he was still quite 
prepared to take this critical attitude towards second-order ideas, such as the 
ideas of philosophers and other intellectuals. (This is surely another aspect of 
his distrust of intellectuals).  
Again, I find this problematic, since I’m not sure that there is a stable 
‘position’ to be had here (noli tangere when it comes to first-order ideas, or the 
ideas of laypeople, the complete opposite when it comes to second-order ideas, 
or those of intellectuals). For one thing, I’m not sure that the distinctions which 
I’ve been working with (like first-order/second-order, and 
laypeople/intellectuals) are anything more than rough-and-ready. But while I’m 
well aware that Feyerabend might not have cared at all about there not being a 
stable position here, I care about it.  
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What Feyerabend Might have Meant (or said): the Bifurcated Path  
Nevertheless, I think Feyerabend is quite right that those on the receiving 
end of Xenophanes’ criticisms could have insulated their beliefs against them. 
Xenophanes’ argument, after all, targets a particular kind of belief, not 
commonsense beliefs (as Feyerabend says sometimes), but religious beliefs (as 
he elsewhere recognises). One can quite well impose a bifurcation between 
such matters and others, since one can quite well think that religious beliefs are 
beliefs of a distinctive kind. That is, Feyerabend might have meant (or might 
have argued) that the apparatus of reason (here, logic and methodology) cannot, 
or should not, be applied to these matters (or should be applied only to some 
diminished extent). This, too, would be to follow a significant philosophical 
tradition. One thinks, for example, of Kant’s claim that setting the limits of 
reason makes room for faith. Or of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion, in 
which it is denied that religious beliefs are theoretical beliefs. This tradition 
even has its representatives in science (Stephen Jay Gould’s portrayal of 
science and religion as ‘non-overlapping magisteria’). Here I think 
Wittgenstein’s line has something going for it, in that it allows that religious 
beliefs are beliefs, but insists that they aren’t theories, and thus that they can’t 
be evaluated for theoretical truth/falsity. To be a religious believer is, as he 
once put it, to have ‘a passionate commitment to a system of reference’ 
(Wittgenstein (1980), p.64).  
To take any such line is to insulate religion from the full glare of the 
apparatus of reason (critical and otherwise). And this seems to be the dominant 
strand in the accommodation to which we are coming in contemporary Western 
societies. It means, though, that one can’t even start down the path that 
Xenophanes trod. One can’t follow him even in regarding monotheistic 
religions as being rationally preferable to polytheistic ones. Much further than 
this, though, it means that in matters of religious belief, as one might put it, 
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anything goes. So whether I worship God, Allah, Zeus, Amon Ra, Thor, 
Vishnu, Satan, or any combination of the above, whether I think Jesus Christ 
was a troublemaker, a prophet (but not the last prophet), the Son of God, or the 
first incarnation of the Emperor Haile Selassie, or whether even, in the final 
analysis, I worship an invisible intangible whatnot, my beliefs are intellectually 
and socially protected. As long as I can persuade others that I really consider 
the things I worship to have some spiritual power, and as long as I declare that 
these are my deeply-felt convictions, they are protected from public evaluation 
by others except in eudaimonistic terms. Rationalists can think what they want 
about them (although they can’t now say it, in the UK, at least), but their 
estimation of my religious beliefs isn’t allowed to affect whether I can continue 
to believe them, promote them, etc. Insofar as Feyerabend was adverting to the 
possibility, perhaps even the desirability, of such a bifurcation, he’s right.  
So, when one bears in mind what Popper means by ‘rational’ (i.e., 
accompanied by a second-order critical tradition), the claim that there is no 
acceptable alternative to being ‘rational’ is just the kind of thing that 
Feyerabend would challenge, and when it comes to religious belief the 
challenge has some merit. Not only can humans proceed in this way, this is the 
path we are now taking.  
I won’t say that I think this is the line that Feyerabend should have taken. 
Personally, I suppose I’m too much of a rationalist, and not sympathetic enough 
to religious belief of any kind. I think one can quite well start down 
Xenophanes’ path, and that when one does so one gets quite quickly to 
something Feyerabend seems to have despised – ‘the God of the philosophers’, 
and then beyond this to agnosticism, if not to atheism.  
 
Better than Relativism  
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I do think, though, that this bifurcated path has a distinct advantage over 
relativism, since I agree with Popper that relativism about truth is untenable. 
When applied to religious belief, the idea that one thing is true ‘for me’, 
another true ‘for you’ is either merely a version of the view I have outlined (in 
which ‘true for X’ just means that it’s X’s belief), or it’s a charade, that is, an 
attempt to use the concept of truth in a certain way, but a way in which the 
concept doesn’t allow. Of course, Feyerabend would point out that concepts are 
ambiguous and flexible, and they can be altered. But different concepts are 
ambiguous and flexible to different degrees, and I’m not as convinced as 
Feyerabend that the concept of truth is flexible in this way. It’s true that 
concepts can be altered, but there must be a pressing reason to do so, and 
because the bifurcated position I have sketched is available, I can’t see any 
reason to mangle the concept of truth in the way the relativist wants.  
 
Rejecting Rationality Entirely?  
In giving Feyerabend the option of this bifurcated path, I have not 
capitulated in any way to the suggestion that the apparatus of rationality 
shouldn’t be applied in science. Sometimes Feyerabend really is suggesting 
this, I think, and I don’t want to follow him down that road.  
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